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STATE RATE REGULATION AND THE SUPREME
COURT, 1922-1930
The constitutional canons of rate regulation may be simply
stated. Rates of enterprises affected with a public interest or
devoted to a public use1 are subject to legislative and administrative regulation, but the rates prescribed by governmental
action must not be so low as to yield to the enterprise less than
a fair return on the fair value of the property employed therein.
Such is the rule of constitutional law. All that remains is the
problem of its application. This involves the choice of the appropriate canons to be used and the ascertainment or estimate
of the facts in each particular case. Since the issue of confiscation depends upon the facts as well as upon the law, the facts
must be subject to judicial inquiry. Thus courts must think like
engineers and bookkeepers as well as like lawyers. The ultimate
decision may turn upon any one of several factors or upon some
combination of two or more of them. For this reason, cases on
rate regulation have a peculiar propensity to be sui generis.
The effort to sum them up by general statements is likely td
yield little enlightenment for its pains.
Most rate cases are started in these days by an effort on one
side or the other to get an injunction. A few arise out of statutory proceedings to secure more direct judicial review of administrative action. However the fight is begun, it comes to the
Supreme Court of the United States as an issue whether the
court below should be affirmed or reversed. The decree below
may be thought right even if in a number of details the court
"For Supreme Court decisions from 1922 to 1930 on what enterprises may be included within the class of those affected with a public
interest or devoted to a public use, see Thomas Reed Powell, "State
Utilities and the Supreme Court, 1922-1930," 29 Mich. L. Rev. 811-838.
The second installment of the article (29 Mich. L. Rev. 1001-1030) reviews decisions for the same period on the Imposition of Duties and
Liabilities on Public Utilities.
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below may be thought wrong. Likewise the decree below may be
thought wrong even though the court that rendered it was not
wholly wrong. If the Supreme Court may find in a single point
adequate grounds for affirmance or reversal, it need not pronounce itself upon other points which have also been contested.
The appellate court passes upon the record, not upon the
quarrel. Some of its judgments are merely tentative. The lower
court may be told to do its work over again without being advised as to what conclusion it should reach. 'Where the injunction asked for is an interlocutory one, its denial or issue is not
scrutinized as carefully as when a final injunction is involved.
For these and other reasons we seldom, if ever, get the
whole story of any rate dispute in the opinion which the
Supreme Court may utter about it. An adequate account of
any single controversy would require examination of everything that happened before and after the case reached the
Supreme Court, and it would take more space than can here be
given to outline the story of all the controversies that came before that court in eight years. Even the reporting of Supreme
Court action and Supreme Court talk must fall far short of
conveying full enlightment of what that court had to do with
the controversies. Voluminous records which come to the court
present much which the court cannot set forth in detail in its
opinions. The opinions themselves often contain much that
must be neglected in any such survey as is possible here. It is
more feasible to tell what the controversy is about than to tell
much about it. As a study of law, our summary is bound to be
pathetically inadequate. The most that it can hope to do is to
give some inkling of the work of the Supreme Court as arbitrator of the rate controversies that come before it by reason
of the prescriptions of states and municipalities. As a study
in government as contrasted with law, the record may have
significance for its illustration of one phase of the judicial
centralization that has come about on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In view of the fact that each case may present several points
and that consideration of one point is not wholly independent
of consideration of another, it has been thought best to present,
first, a separate account of each case with indication of the
various points involved so that the struggles may be viewed as
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the lawyers presented them. Law suits are lawsuits and not
merely duels of two contending principles. Yet principles in the
law there are perhaps, and so an effort will be made later to
make a more analytical arrangement of the accounting or legal
issues that are involved in the quarrels recited and to offer a report of Supreme Court utterance or action on each issue. There
has been dispute about generalities even though the disputants
agreed on the disposition of the case before them. Perhaps
generalities have their place even when they do not decide cases.
I.

CONSPECTUS OF TH1E CASES

An order of a state commission reducing the rates of a telephone company was set aside by a unanimous court in Missouri
ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission,2 but the justices did not all agree in the reasons for
their agreement. Mr. Justice Brandeis, for himself and Mr.
Justice Holmes, concurred because of opinion that the order
prevented the utility from earning a fair return on the amount
prudently invested by it. He presented no figures of the investment or probable return in the case at bar, but devoted himself
wholly to a consideration of the superiority of the rate base of
"prudent investment" over that of "reproduction cost new,
less depreciation." For the rest o2 the court Mr. Justice
McReynolds based the decision on the fact that the commission
had ignored the cost of reproducing the property in its existing
state, that consideration of this factor would result in a valuation of at least $25,000,000, that the return under the contested
rates as estimated by the commission would, after allowing six
2262 U. S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct. 544 (1923), considered in John Bauer,
"The Supreme Court and Reproduction Value in Rate Making," 12 Nat.
Mun. Rev. 529; Hillyer Blake Brown, "The Defects in Mr. Justice
Brandeis' Theory of Prudent Investment as a Rate Base," 12 Calif. L.
Rev. 283; Frederick G. Dorety, "The Function of Reproduction Cost in
Public Utility Valuation and Rate Making," 37 Harv. L. Rev. 173;
Edwin C. Goddard, "Fair Value of Public Utilities," 22 Mich. L. Rev.
652, 777; Nathan Matthews, "The Effect of the Recent Decisions of
the Supreme Court on Reproductfon Cost as a Test of Value," 37
Harv. L. Rev. 431; Henry Rottschaefer, "Valuation in Rate Cases,"
9 Milnn. L. Rev. 211;Philip Barton Warren, "Value as a Rate Base for
Public Utilities," 6 Ill. L. Q. 97; and notes in 96 Cent. L. J. 255; 22
Mich. L. Rev. 147; and 24 Mich. I. Rev. 166.
This case is of course considered in many of the other articles
published during the period under review and listed in succeeding
notes.
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per cent for depreciation, which the commission accepted as appropriate, amount to only five and one-third per cent which was
wholly inadequate as interest rates were at the time. The company's engineers had contended for an estimate of over $31,000,000 which was made up of about $24,000,000 for reproduction cost of the physical plant less depreciation, about $1,000,000
for working capital, and over $5,000,000 for cost of establishing
the business. This latter item was neglected by the court in
reaching its estimate of $25,000,000, but it was not explicitly rejected as inappropriate. The book value shown by the company as actual cost of plant, equipment, and working capital
was nearly $23,000,000. The commission objected to the inclusion in this of certain items of non-useful property. It reached
an estimate of some $20,000,000 by taking as a standard its own
estimates of the value of selected parts of the plant in 1913,
1914 and 1916, and then applying to the valuation claimed by
the company a percentage determined by the difference between
the values fixed by the company and by the commission on the
three selected sections of the total plant. The commission did
not claim this valuation to be more than tentative. For all that
appears, these earlier valuations made by the commission had
regarded reproduction cost as of the times they were made, for
the only specific criticism passed by Mr. Justice McReynolds
upon its action was the failure to accord any weight to the
greatly enhanced costs of construction since the earlier dates.
The opinion of the court consists largely of quotation from the
report of the commission and from the opinions in earlier cases.
To this there is added:
"It is impossible to ascertain what will amount to a fair return
upon properties devoted to the public service without giving consideration to the cost of labor, supplies, etc., at the time the investigation is made. An honest and intelligent forecast of probable future
values, made upon a view of all the relevant circumstances, is essential.
If the highly important element of present costs is wholly disregarded,
such a forecast becomes impossible. Estimates for tomorrow cannot
ignore prices of today.""
"262 U. S. 276, 287-288.
Recent Developments of the law of rate regulation are discussed
in Frederick K. Beutel, "Valuation as a Requirement of Due Process
of Law in Rate Cases," 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1249; Frederick KMBeutel,
"Due Process in Valuation of Local Utilities," 13 Minn. L. Rev. 409;
Cassius M. Clay, "Control of Public Utility Rates and the Supreme
Court," 64 U. S. L. Rev. 464; L. Dale Coffman, "The Meaning and
Ascertainment of 'Value' of Public Utilities," 15 Iowa L. Rev. 401;
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For a like failure to give any substantial weight to price
of labor and commodities at the time of the rate prescription, a
state commission and a state court were reversed in Bluefield
Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public; Service Commission." Mr. Justice Brandeis concurred specially for the reasons given by him in the preceding case. In this case the commission had fixed a value of $460,000 in place of the company's
estimate of $900,000. The commission had reached its result
by adding $10,000 for working capital and ten per cent for going
value to the cost of the plant, less depreciation, as shown on the
oompany's books. It had been guided largely by an estimate
made by it in 1915, to which it added subsequent expenditures
for construction. The rates fixed by the commission were estimated by it to be sufficient to leave the company six per cent on
the commission's valuation, after deducting two per cent for
depreciation. The net return of six per cent was declared by
Mr. Justice Butler to be too low. This was unnecessary to the
disposition of the case, since the rate-base was also too low.
Other matters of dispute respecting various items of value to be
considered in making up the total were left unconsidered. 5
R. V. Fletcher, "Recent Developments in Railroad Valuation," 52 Rep.
Am. Bar Ass'n 669; Edwin C. Goddard, "The Evolution of Cost of Reproduction as the Rate Base," 41 Harv. L. Rev. 564; Ben R. Howell,
"Recent Developments in the Application of the Rule of Smyth v. Ames
In Valuation Proceedings in the Federal Courts," 3 Tex. L. Rev. 412;
John F. MacLane, "Recent Developments in Public Utility Law," 53
Rep. Am. Bar Ass'n 679; Gustavus H. Robinson, "Recent Cases on the
Public Utility Rate Base: The 'Valuation' War," 8 Bost. U. L. Rev.
255; Gustavus H. Robinson, "Duty of a Public Utility to Serve at
Reasonable Rates: The 'Valuation' War," 6 No. Car. L. Rev. 243;
Lawrence P. Simpson, "Development of Public Utility Rate Valuation,"
5 Ala. L. Rev. 195; Lawrence P. Simpson, "The Meaning of Present
Value as Public Utility Rate Base," 35 W. Va. L. Q. 335.
' 262 U. S. 679, 43 Sup. Ct. 675 (1923), considered in John Bauer,
"Reproduction Cost Has Not Been Adopted by Supreme Court," 12
Nat. Mun. Rev. 644; Thomas Porter Hardman, "Recent Developments
In Regard to Rate Regulation," 30 W. Va. L. Q. 70; and Donald R.
Rlchberg, "The Supreme Court Discusses Value," 37 Harv. L. Rev. 289.
The articles listed here and later as discussing a particular case
are not restricted to the particular case to which they are appended.
5Problems of valuation are considered in James C. Bonbright, "Tlie
Problem of Judicial Valuation," 27 Colum. L. Rev. 493; "The Economic
Merits of Original Cost and Reproduction Cost," 41 Harv.
L. Rev. 593; and "The Breakdown of 'Present Value' as a Basis of
Rate Control," 14 Proc. Acad. Pol. Sci. (N. Y.) 75; Leslie Craven,
"Railroad Valuation: A Statement of the Problem," 9 A. B. A. Jour.
681, 801, and 48 Rep. Am. Bar Ass'n 644; Nathaniel T. Guernsey,
"Value in Confiscation Cases," 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 575; Robert L. Hale,
'alue and Vested Rights," 27 Colum. L. Rev. 523; -Samuel W. Moore,
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Refusal of state commission and state court to give strict
application of the standard of replacement cost less depreciation
in valuing the physical properties of a gas company was held
in Georgia Railway & Power Co. v. Railroad (om'missione not to
be in itself a sufficient cause for holding a rate confiscatory. Mr.
Justice Brandeis states that "the commission gave careful consideration to the cost of reproduction, but it refused to adopt
reproduetion cost as the measure of value." No reasons are
given why the careful consideration resulted in rejection. Some
of the construction had been recent when high prices prevailed,
so that as to this, cost and reproduction cost would not be wide
apart. Reproduction cost was given weight in the allowance of
$125,000 for appreciation in the value of land owned, but this
was a minor matter in the total of $5,250,000 which the commission fixed. That part of the plant which was in existence in
1914 was put in at something near its cost or its reproduction
cost as of that time, though the 1921 costs were round 70 per
cent higher than those of 1914. The company contended for a
total valuation of at least $9,500,000. This included $1,000,000
for the alleged value of a non-exclusive franchise and $1,000,000
for recoupment of past losses, both of which the court held had
been rightly excluded by the commission. It included also about
$450,000 in the items of working capital and going concern
above the amounts allowed by the commission and approved by
the district court. These reductions were approved by the
Supreme Court as findings of fact not clearly shown to be erroneous. This left about $1,800,000 more of the claim of the company which was disallowed by the commission and the two
courts. For aught that appears, this sum may fairly represent
the price-rise from 1914 to 1921 if applied to the property used
in 1914. There is no suggestion that the company's estimate of
present reproduction cost was excessive. The opinion goes on
the ground that what the Constitution requires is not adoption
of reproduction cost but merely careful consideration of it. To
Mr. Justice MeKenna this seemed to be a disregard of the rule
"The Relation of Earning Power Under Reasonable Rates to Railroad
Valuation." 13 Va. L. Rev. 543; Oliver E. Sweet, "Valuation of Railroads and Public Utilities," 51 Rep. Am. Bar Ass'n 860.
0262 U. S. 625, 43 Sup. Ct. 680 (1923). This case is given detailed
consideration in a number of the articles listed in other footnotes. It
is the subject of a note in 15 Nat. Mun. Rev. 485.
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of the prior cases and a rejection of present value. The mystery is that he was alone in dissent. Perhaps the others who
would normally be with him were influenced by the fact that the
Commission had in the past from time to time allowed increases
of rates as costs went up and by the further fact that the case
was heard upon application for an interlocutory injunction and
that the decree of denial in the court below was founded on the
conclusion that enforcement should not be enjoined prior to
actual experience under the reduced rate. The estimated return
was seven and one-quarter per cent after allowing two per
cent for depreciation and regarding the federal income tax as
an operating expense. There must have been a general impression that the rates fixed were likely to prove fair to the company, but it seems difficult to disagree with the dissenting views
of Mr. Justice McKenna tnat here reproduction cost was regarded only to be largely disregarded and that the decision and
opinion of the majority seem to run counter to the attitude of
7
the two other cases decided at the same term.
The contested matters between the parties in Pacific Gas &

'Various Issues of Rate Regulation are discussed in John Bauer,
"Deadlock in Public Utility Regulation," 10 Nat. Mun. Rev. 470, 498,

563; 11 Nat. Mun. Rev. 21, 76, 140; and "Chief Elements of Controversy in Public Utility Rate Making," 14 Nat. Mun. Rev. 215, 284, 506,
749; Harry Gunnison Brown, "Economic Basis and Limits of Public
Utility Regulation," 53 Rep. Am. Bar Ass'n 717; John H. Gray, "The
State Abdicates: Utilities Govern Themselves," 14 Proc. Acad. Pol.
Sci. (N. Y.) 52; S. S. Gregory, "Some Phases of Public Utility Law,"
45 Rep. Am. Bar Ass'n 447; Taylor E. Groninger, "Discontent with
Public Utility Rate Regulation," 4 Ind. L. J. 248; Nathaniel T.
Guernsey, "The Regulation of Public Utilities," 13 Marq. L. Rev. 25;
and "Regulation and Management," 13 Iowa L. Rev. 145; Thomas
Porter Hardman, "The Changing Law of Competition in Public
Service," 33 W. Va. L. Q. 219; and "The Changing Law of Competition in Public Service-Another Word," 34 W. Va L. Q. 123; Orren
C. Hormell, "State Public Utilities Legislation in 1927," 23 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 106; Joseph W. Jamison, "Limitations Upon Governmental
Power in the Regulation of Public Utilities," 53 Rep. Am. Bar Ass'n
684; Joseph W. Jamison, "Economic Limitations Upon the Power of
Congress or of any Regulatory Body to Fix the Return Which Public
Utilities Shall Earn," 54 Rep. Am. Bar Ass'n 812; Edward G. Jennings,
"The Police Power as the Source of Public Utility Legislation," 3
Dak. L. Rev. 91; John E. Kirshman, "The Principle of Competitive
Cost in Public Utility Regulation," 35 Yale L. J. 805; Martin T.
Manton, "Rate Making and Judicial Review," 4 St. Johns Law Rev.
230; and "The Courts and Commission Regulation," 14 Proc. Acad.
Pol. Se. (N. Y.) 177; Frank Milhollan, "Some Utility Problems from
a Legal Standpoint," 51 Rep. Am. Bar Ass'n 841; and Gustavus H.
Robinson, "The Public Utility: A Problem in Social Engineering," 14
Cornell L. Q. 1.
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8
did not involve the physical
Electric Co. v. San Francisco
items to be valued or their reproduction cost new. They were
confined to the valuation of certain patent rights and to the
determination of accrued and annual depreciation. These two
questions were inter-related. The company had paid some
$46,000 for rights to use a patented process which had
resulted in annual reductions of the costs of production claimed
to run from around $100,000 to around $260,000. The inauguration of the process had resulted in the. abandonment of parts
of the plant worth perhaps $800,000. The master had valued the
patent rights at what they cost as against a laim by the company that they were worth the capitalization of the annual savings resulting from their use. The accrued depreciation had
been fixed by the master at around $1,500,000, which left the
property worth about 81 per cent of what it would cost to reproduce it as a new plant. The company contended that the
accrued depreciation should have been fixed at about half the
sum found by the master. The master had used the "modified
sinking fund method" which estimated the life of each part of
the plant, figured the annual reserves necessary to yield enough
for ultimate replacement, and added them together to get the
depreciation already accrued. The company contended that it
was preferable to examine the exact condition of the plant at the
time of appraisal and thus discover how much in fact it had depreciated. Mr. Justice McReynolds, for the majority, remarks
that facts shown by reliable evidence are preferable to averages
based upon assumed probabilities. It is not clear that the difference between the two estimates was due wholly to difference of
method in computing them, and there is no determination of the
precise amount to be allowed. The company, according to Mr.
Justice MeReynolds, does "not insist that the estimated accrued
depreciation is 'grossly excessive'; if confined to the result of
physical causes.'"' This can hardly be accurate, for the company
was contending for a lower accrued depreciation. Mr. Justice
Brandeis says that "the company's objection is not to the particular method selected, but that, in applying it, the master ineluded as depreciation what is called theoretical inadequacy and

:265 U. S. 403, 44 Sup. Ct. 537 (1924).
p265 U. S. 403, 406.

STATE RATE REGuLATIoN AND TE SUPREME COURT

199

obsolescence.' '10 What the company wanted was, if possible, to
value the patented process at a capitalization of its savings, and
otherwise to treat the obsolescence of its plant by reason of the
new process, not as accrued depreciation, but as depreciation to
be anticipated for which in effect the savings in operation should
be charged with large annual sums to recoup it within a few
years. To Mr. Justice Brandeis these questions of valuation and
of estimating depreciation were questions of fact upon which
there was no sufficient basis for overruling the master and the
district court. Mr. Justice Holmes concurred in his opinion.
The views of the majority must be gathered from the concluding
paragraphs of the opinion of Mr. Justice McReynolds:
"Obviously, under the theory accepted below, appellant
worsened its situation for rate-making purposes when it reduced
the cost of manufacturing gas. Introduction of successful
patented inventions enabled the public authorities to lower the
rate base and gather all the benefits. The operating plant, made
capable of producing gas at smaller cost, was declared less valuable than before. The result indicates error somewhere, either
in theory or application of principle.
"Obsolescence of one or more stations and perhaps other
property theretofore of great value (possibly $800,000) followed
installation of the patents, but the remaining plant plus the
patents, gave better results. As an operating unit the new combination had greater value than the old; but the court below
disregarded the demonstrated worth of the element which
wrought this change.
"The obsolescence in question did not result from ordinary
use and wear. Certainly it could not have been long anticipatedthe patents were of recent conception; to provide for it out of
previous revenues was not imperative, if possible. Former consumers were not beneficiaries; only subsequent ones could be
advantaged.
"Our concern is with confiscation. Rate-making is no function of the courts; their duty is to inquire concerning results
and uphold the guaranties which inhibit the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation under any
guise. We may not, therefore, relegate appellant's claim for
-Ibid.,

422.
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past services to the future consideration of the State Commission, as the master suggests. After adopting the reduced costs
of manufacture for estimating net returns, the court gave no
proper valuation to the inventions which caused the reduction,
and thereby permitted property to be taken without just compensation. The amount of money actually paid to the inventors
was not the proper measure of worth. Experience had demonstrated a much higher one; and to obtain the benefit of their
use appellant sacrificed much.
"Installation of the inventions necessitated new outlay of
money and abandonment of property theretofore valuableboth were necessary in order that the cost of manufacture might
be reduced. If appellant's permissible profits depend upon the
lowered costs and it is denied adequate return upon property
which made the reduction possible, or recompense for the obsolescence, successful efforts to improve the service will prove
extremely disadvantageous to it.
"Whether, under the peculiar circumstances here presented,
the rate base should be fixed by adding to the agreed inventory
some fair valuation of the patent rights, or whether prompt recoupment should be allowed for the obsolescence caused by their
introduction, or whether appellant should be saved from actual
ultimate loss by some other feasible method, we will not undertake to determine upon the present record. To the end that the
issues may be reconsidered in view of this opinion, the decree
below is reversed and the cause remanded for such further proceedings as the circumstances require, including another reference to the master, if deemed advisable.""
-Ibid., 415-416.
For discussion of inclusion in the rate base of various elements
of value in addition to the value of the physical plant, see Edward
W. Bemis, "Going Value in Rate Cases in the Supreme Court," 27
Colum. L. Rev. 530; Ben W. Lewis, "Going Value and Rate Regulation," 26 Mich. L. Rev. 713; William W. Potter, "Going Value," 50
Rep. Am. Bar Ass'n 867; and "Going Value," 24 Mich. L. Rev. 232;
William L. Ransom, "Going Value," 49 Rep. Am. Bar Ass'n 681;
Irwin S. Rosenbaum, "Going Value Allowance in Ohio Rate Cases,"
3 U. Cin. I Rev. 237; Karl Stecher, "The Determination of Working
Capital in Railroad and Public Utilities Valuations," 39 Yale L. J. 927;
Delos F. Wilcox, "Working Capital in Street Railway Valuation," Ann.
Amer. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. (Supplement for Nov., 1920); C. J. Foreman, "Conflicting Theories of Good Will," 22 Colum. L. Rev. 638.
On other problems of valuation, see Fred Esch, "Valuation of
Leased Railroad Property," 33 Yale L. J. 272; Frank Parker, "Cost
of Money as an Element in the Valuation of Public Utilities," 74
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The dispute in Ohio Utilities Co. v. Public Utilities (ommision 12 involved mainly reductions made by the commission in
the values found by its own engineers and acquiesced in by the
company. The commission had reduced by some $10,000 the
engineers' valuation of $154,655.93 which had been reached by
an itemized inventory and a valuation based on reproduction
cost less depreciation. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed
the state court which had sustained the commission. Mr. Justice
Sutherland found no evidence in the record to justify the cuts
imposed by the commission and approved by the state court, and
said that it was therefore "evident that the state supreme
court did not accord to the plaintiff in error that sort of judicial
inquiry to which, under the decisions of this court, it was entitled." The commission had excluded $5,000 for preliminary
organization expenses, apparently on the ground that there was
no proof that they had been incurred. Mr. Justice Sutherland said
that such proof, while it might be helpful, is not indispensable.
The question is not whether such expenditures have been made
but whether they would have to be made if the enterprise were
to be imaginatively annihilated and re-created. Some such expenditures would necessarily be incurred, and the rejection of
the entire amount is clearly arbitrary. So with interest during
imaginative reconstruction which the commission had reduced
about $3,000 without putting into the record any evidence in
justification. Likewise unsupported by evidence were found the
commission cuts of $1,316.42 on necessary working capital and
of $276.15 on value of plant, the latter evidently to get an even
$122,000. The commission in estimating operating expenses,
made a slight shave from the figure of expenses actually incurred
in the preceding year, giving as a reason that the plant had
been inefficiently operated. For this the court found no evidence in the record, and, indeed, found evidence to the contrary
in the testiniony of the commission's engineer. After deducting
the five per cent allowance for depreciation which the commission reckoned, the anticipated return would be less than 5 per
U. Pa. L. Rev. 464; William G. Raymond, "Engineer's Methods of
Inventorying and Valuing Public Utility Properties," 9 Iowa L. Rev.
36; Charles Reltell, "Invested Earnings," 86 Ann. Amer. Acad. Pol. &
Soc. Scd. (No. 175) 132 (Nov., 1919).
On rate of return, see Charles B. Elder, "The Constitutional Rate
of Return for Public Utilities," 25 Ill. L. Rev. 1, 165.
Is267 U. S. 359, 45 Sup. Ct. 259 (1925).
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cent, which Mr. Justice Sutherland said was so clearly inadequate as to amount to confiscation. So the case was sent back
3
for reappraisal.'
While the complaining telephone company in Board of Publie Utility Commissioners v. New York Telephone Co.14 was
said by Mr. Justice Butler to contest the commission's estimate
of property value, there is no consideration of the correctness
of the $88,417,448 fixed by the board. According to the commission, the existing rates would yield 5.04 per cent on average
cost and 4.93 per cent on average fair and reasonable value after
deducting $3,314,716, as the annual depreciation charge. The
company insisted that there should be a larger charge for annual
depreciation, but there was no adjudication of this difference.
It was conceded on all sides that on these facts alone the existing
rates would not yield a fair return. The Board's refusal to
grant a higher rate was based on its finding that the $16,902,530
set up on the company's books as reserve for accrued depreciation was excessive and on its ruling that at least $4,750,000 of
that amount be used until exhausted to make up any deficiencies
in fair return for the immediately ensuing years. The idea was
that past excessive depreciation should be corrected by future
.Various questions relating to rates are considered in Charles M.
Bracelen, "The Function of the Utility in Rate Making," 49 Rep. Am.
Bar Ass'n 671; Kenneth F. Burgess, "An Economic Measure for Railroad Rates," 50 Rep. Am. Bar Ass'n 804; Julius Henry Cohen, Confiscatory Rates and Modern Finance," 39 Yale L. J. 151; Charles E.
Cullen, "The Long and Short Haul Rule In Missouri," 13 St. Louis L.
Rev. 13; Nathaniel T. Guernsey, "Principles Underlying Reasonable
Rates," 2 Ala. L. J. 3; "The Test of Reasonable Rates," 14 Va. L. Rev.
1; and "State Commission Laws Regulate Rates, Not Profits," 13
Va. L. Rev. 257; Robert L. Hale, "Non-Cost Standards in Rate Making,"
36 Yale L. J. 56; Edward S. Jouett, "The Law of Railroad Rate-MakIng," 10 Va. L. Rev. 618; William E. McCurdy, "The Power of a Public
Utility to Fix Its Rates and Charges in the Absence of Regulatory
Legislation," 38 Harv. L. Rev. 202; William A. McInerny, "Service
Charge in Rate Making," 4 Notre Dame Law. 48: Maurice H. Merrill,
"On the Distinction Between a Nonconfiscatory Rate and a Just and
Reasonable Rate," 14 Cornell L. Q. 447; Samuel W. Moore, "Railroad
Rates and Revenues," 16 Va. L. Rev. 243; Gustavus H. Robinson,
"Business Enterprise and the Public Utility's Duty to Serve Without
Discrimination," 13 Minn. L. Rev. 104; Gustavus H. Robinson, "The
Filed Rate in Public Utility Law: A Study in Mechanical Jurisprudence," 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 213; Scott Rowley, "Rate-Making and the
Ownership and Financing of Railways," 11 Iowa L. Rev. 354; A. H.
Ryall, "The Principle of Reparation Applied to Rate Regulation," 23
Mich. L. Rev. 223; and Clarence Milton Updegraff, "Deductions from
the Economic Basis of Public Utility Rates," 12 Iowa L. Rev. 249.
1"271 U. S. 23, 46 Sup. Ct. 363 (1926), discussed In 15 Nat. Mun.
Rev. 363 and 36 Yale L. J. 123.
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inadequate annual depreciation. The Board allowed for annual
depreciation over $2,600,000 less than what it determined the
annual depreciation to be, and thereby raised the anticipated
return from 4.93 to 7.53 per cent, thus justifying its refusal to
permit an increase in rates. For a unanimous court, Mr. Justice
Stone not sitting, Mir. Justice Butler declared that these past
accumulations are the property of the company, even though
acquired by excessive reserves for depreciation, and that past
profits cannot be used to sustain confiscatory rates for the
future. The district court was therefore affirmed in its decree
enjoining the commission from requiring the continuation of
15
existing inadequate rates.
Injunction proceedings against a rate for water service
fixed by a commission came before the Supreme Court in
M Cardle v. Indianapolis Water Co. 1 6 on an appeal by the city
and the commission from a decree of the district court enjoining the rates. Upon petition the commission had found existing
rates too low and had granted an increase which did not satisfy
the company. The commission had found the total value of the
property to be $15,260,400 and had allowed rates which in its
opinion would produce a seven per cent return over an average
of the three succeeding years. In the injunction proceeding
brought by the company, the district court had found the value
of the property to be not less than $19,000,000 and had enjoined
the new rates as inadequate. In sustaining this decree, Mr. Justice Butler says that this $19,000,000 could not have been
reached by figuring reproduction cost less depreciation "on
2For
discussions of depreciation, see James C. Bonbright, "Depreciation and Valuation for Rate Control," 27 Colum. L. Rev. 113;
Nathaniel T. Guernsey, "Should the Amount of What is Frequently
Called the Depreciation Reserve be Deducted in Arriving at Value?"
51 Rep. Am. Bar Ass'n 816; "The Rule as to Depreciation in Determining Value," 5 Tenn. L. Rev. 183; and "Some Depreciation Questions," 4 Temp. L. Q. 203; H. C. Hasbrouck, "When Should Depreciation be Deducted to Find the Rate-Making Value of Public Utilities?,"
10 Cornell L. Q. 471; and Edwin P. Wolfe, "Depreciation in Rate Making," 4 St. Johns L. Rev. 214.
16272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144 (1926), considered In John Bauer,
"The Supreme Court Speaks Again on 'Fair Value'," 16 Nat. Mun. Rev.
106; Charles T. Goldberg and H. William Ihrig, "The Valuation of
Public Utilities," 11 Marq. L. Rev. 242; Donald R. Richberg, "ValueBy Judicial Flat," 40 Harv. L .Rev. 567; and notes in 7 Bost. U. L.
Rev. 319; 27 Colum. L. Rev. 721; 14 Marq. L. Rev. 102; 26 Mich. L.
Rev. 89; 11 Minn. L. Rev. 642, 674; 13 Va. L. Rev. 483; and 36 Yale
L. J. 1151.
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spot prices as of January 1, 1924." The company was defending this figure on the ground that it did not represent spot
prices of reproduction, and the majority of the Supreme Court
agrees with it on the facts. The city was contending that the
figure did represent spot prices and that therefore the valuation
was too high. The Supreme Court finds that on some basis
other than that of spot prices the figure is not excessive. The
case clearly cannot hold that present spot prices must be taken
for reproduction cost. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in dissenting
quotes the opinion of the district court which shows that it
thought itself required by recent Supreme Court decisions to
give dominating weight to spot prices, and that it fixed $19,000,000 as the minimum on that basis, awarding no more solely
because the company did not ask for more. He thinks, therefore, that the affirmance of the district court affirms its application of the rule of spot prices, and that the decree should be
reversed and the case sent back for determination of present
value in the light of all applicable rules, among which is the
one that present prices of reproduction are not necessarily controlling. Mr. Justice Stone joins in this dissent. Mr. Justice
Holmes confines his concurrence with the majority to concurrence in result. Mr. Justice Butler nowhere says that spot
prices are necessarily determining. He says that values must
"generally follow the relatively permanent levels and trends"
of prices of labor and materials, and he finds nothing in the
record before him to indicate that prices prevailing on January
1, 1924, were likely to decline within three years. He clearly
negatives the propriety of accepting the commission's estimate
based on average prices for the ten years ending in 1921. The
commission's engineer testified that application of the average
of prices for ten years ending with 1923 would reach the
result of $17,000,000 for reproduction cost of physical plant
less depreciation. The commission itself included over $1,500,000 for going value, working capital and water rights, and engineers hired by the company to ascertain the truth with respect
to these values had made estimates of $2,735,000 and $2,961,245.
The figure set by the district court for the total value was $2,000,000 below the sum of the intangible values found by the
commission and the spot-price reproduction cost fixed by the
commission's engineer. It was over $6,000,000 below the aver-
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age of the two estimates made by engineers chosen and paid by
the company. Thus the company was either skeptical or
eleemosynary in proposing and accepting a valuation some
$6,000,000 lower than what it supported by evidence. The distriet court was of opinion that it might have sustained a much
higher value. Thus the case on its facts stands merely for one
of the jumbles characteristic of the so-called application of the
so-called rule of Smyth v. Ames. It holds that more weight
must be given to reproduction cost than the commission chose
to give in the particular instance, but even the opinion does. not
insist that spot prices must be taken to determine reproduction
cost irrespective of anticipations of the future price level. Mr.
Justice Brandeis' dissent ssems to make the majority go farther
than their printed words disclose. Undoubtedly Mr. Justice
Butler's 1926 prescience as to future prices led him to lend
more weight to the high scale then obtaining than he would now
care to give to the results he failed to foresee. But the weight
he would give to present prices is still only the weight which he
thinks they deserve, and this, he clearly recognizes, depends
somewhat upon anticipations as to the future. Mr. Justice
Brandeis points out the ineptitude of present prices as well
when they are low as when they are high. One may imagine
that M1r. Justice Butler may lean more toward past averages
17
from now on than he has in the past.
17On various problems relating to the financing and the intercorporate relations of utilities, see James C. Bonbright, "The Basis
of Railroad Capitalization," 35 Pol. Sci. Q. 30; Julius Henry Cohen,
"Confiscatory Rates and Modern Finance," 39 Yale L. J. 151; Robert
L. Hale, "The Courts and the Attraction of Capital," 14 Proc. Acad.
Pol. Si. (N. Y.) 96; John E. Kirshman, "The Principle of Competitive
Cost in Public Utility Regulation," 35 Yale L. J. 805; Irwin S. Rosenbaum and David E. Lilienthal, "Issuance of Securities by Public
Service Corporations," 37 Yale L. J. 716, 908; Irwin S. Rosenbaum,
"Regulation of Security Issues by the Ohio Public Utilities Commission," 4 U. Cin. L. Rev. 321; Scott Rowley, "Rate-Making and the
Ownership and Financing of Railways," 11 Iowa L. Rev. 354; Maurice
C. Waltersdorf, "State Control of Utility Capitalization," 37 Yale L. J.
337; David E. Lilienthal, "The Regulation of Public Utility Holding
Companies," 29 Colum. L. Rev. 404; Samuel W. Moore, "Our Lagging
Railway Mergers," 15 Va. L. Rev. 743; William M. Wherry, "Principles
Applicable to Consolidation and Merger of Public Utilities," 6 N. Y.
U. L. Rev. 143; and notes in 41 Harv. L. Rev. 928, on control over purchase of stock by holding company; in 14 St. Louis L. Rev. 299, 442,
on regulating payments by utility to holding company; in 37 Yale L, J.
675, on case holding power to prescribe uniform accounting does not
include power to determine measure of value for fixed capital; and
in 38 Yale L. J. 685, on power over issuance of shares by foreign corporations.
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The issue on which the dispute in Unite F'uel Gas Co. v.
Rai7road Commission's was found to turn was the proper value
to be assigned to the gas rights and leaseholds owned by the
complainants. These were rights to extract gas from the lands
of others, and were valued by the commission at $6,742,920, at
which sum they were carried on the company's books. The
company contended for a valuation of $36,449,176, based on
testimony as to the profit that would be received from the extraction of the gas and its sale in an unregulated market. This testimony was rejected by the Supreme Court as altogether too
speculative. The unregulated market which the complainants
hypostatized was Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, which is 130 miles
from their nearest lines. Mr. Justice Stone observed that it is
inadmissible to assume that there will remain an unregulated
market. He found equally speculative the estimates as
to the quantities of gas that could be extracted in the future,
the prices that natural gas would in later years bring in competition with other gas, and the future cost of transportation and
distribution. With this evidence rejected, the court fell back
on the book value of the leases recognized by the company, not
necessarily as the true value, but as a value assumed by the
complainants, which cannot on the evidence be put at any higher
figure. The complainant objected also to the conclusion of the
court below that one-half of the profits on the sale of gasoline
could be attributed to the natural gas. The gas and gasoline
come from a common flow and are joint products. It was
shown that allowance by the gasoline extracting company of 50
per cent of its net earnings from gasoline extraction would still
leave it earning amounts which varied from 80.40 to 102 per
cent annually on its capital, so that the payment of 50 per cent
to the natural gas company would not seem excessive. The gas
company had created the gasoline company as a subsidiary and
contracted with it for a payment of only one-eighth of its gross
profit, but Mr. Justice Stone rejected this arrangement by pointing out that a corporation may not make a rate confiscatory by
reducing its net returns by arrangement with a subsidiary under
its control. The company which furnished the gas in Kentucky
which was involved in the present proceeding was a newly created
18278 U. S. 300, 49 Sup. Ct. 150 (1929), considered in 35 W. Va.
L. Q. 364 and 38 Yale L. J. 116.
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subsidiary which purchased gas from its parent at 30 cents per
1,000 cubic feet, but it was agreed that this contract and the
separate creation of the Kentucky subsidiary should be neglected, and attention should be directed to that part of the
whole physical property of the intertwined corporations that
could be regarded as properly allocated to the furnishing of the
Kentucky supply. This was taken to be not more than 12 per
cent, which resulted in a valuation of $5,326,530 with the inclusion of the leasehold rights at their book value. This would
require $745,714 annually as a fair return on an eight per cent
basis, after deducting one and one-half per cent for depreciation and four and one-half per cent for amortization. The
amortization allowance was deemed to be sufficient to replace
the entire property at the end of eighteen years when it was
assumed that the wells would cease to be productive. The depreciation allowance was said by Mr. Justice Stone not to be
seriously questioned by the company. The return under the
assailed 32-cent rate was $749,839, a trifle more than the eight
per cent requirement on the valuation found by including the
gas rights at their book value. Several contentions by the company were left unadjudicated, since the return was found to
be adequate even if they were granted. So without deciding
upon their validity, the court accepted for the case the assumptions that the rate base should be present reproduction cost of
property used and useful in the business, that the Kentucky
business should be remunerative when considered by itself, that
so-called "probable" areas of gas production should be included
in the property even though not at present used that depreciation and amortization should be calculated on the basis of present value rather than of original cost, and that the so-called
"delay rentals" paid on leases not yet productive should be
treated as present operating expenses. There was a lee-way of
nearly $8,000,000 between the estimate of overhead charges and
going concern value made by the commission and that insisted
on by the company, but this difference was not arbitrated by the
Supreme Court, for even on the company's figures for these
items an eight per cent return would be realized. Though the
court was unanimous, Mr. Justice McReynolds confined his concurrence to the result.
The facts in the companion case of United FPuel Gas Co.
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v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia1 9 differ somewhat, but the main bone of contention was the valuation of the
leasehold rights as in the case from Kentucky. With those
valued at book value the Supreme Court found no reason for
disturbing the decree of the district court denying an interlocutory injunction. On the valuation found by the district
court the rates would yield over eight per cent, after deducting 1.12 per cent for depreciation and 3.65 per cent for amortization. There are differences of method in reporting the values
claimed by the company and those found by the commission and
by the court below, so that comparison of them is difficult. Evidently the company threw its chief weight against the limitation of the value of the leasehold rights to the amount at which
they were carried on their own books, for Mr. Justice Stone says
that "with respect to the other conclusions of the court below,
there is no serious suggestion that the court abused its discretion." The decree is affirmed on the ground of the absence of
any clear evidence warranting interference with the denial of
an interlocutory injunction. Mr. Justice MeReynolds again concurs only in the result.
The major question in United States Railways & Electric
Co. v. West 20 was whether a return of 6.26 per cent upon the
value of a street railroad is compensatory. The company asked
for a rate estimated to produce 7.44 per cent, though insisting
that this was not adequate. Mr. Justice Sutherland said that
in view of the special situations of street railroads it is not
certain that a return of even eight per cent would not be necessary to avoid confiscation. He declared that clearly the company
was entitled to the 7.44 per cent for which it contended. The
plant of the company was valued by the commission at $75,000,000, and this valuation was accepted by both parties in the
state court. IV the Supreme Court the company contended for
the omission of $5,000,000 which had been included because the
state court held that the right to use the streets is an easement
which is property belonging to the company. The objection to
19278 U. S. 322, 49 Sup. Ct. 157 (1929).
20280 U. S. 234, 50 Sup. Ct. 123 (1930), discussed in Arthur H.
Ryall, "The Real Significance of the Baltimore Railways Case," 28 Mich.
L. Rev. 789; and notes in 10 Bost. U. L. Rev. 439; 30 Colum. L. Rev.
414; 19 Nat. Mun. Rev. 199; 7 N. Y. Univ. L. Rev. 710; and 8 Tenn.
L. Rev. 206. The case in the court below is discussed in 26 Mich. I.
Rev. 677.
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valuing this so-called easement was left without other consideration by MYr. Justice Sutherland than the conment that, if it
ever possessed substance, it comes too late. To Mr. Justice
Brandeis, on the other hand, the ojection goes to the issue
whether the rate is confiscatory under the federal Constitution.
The state court may say that the state constitution requires the
inclusion of such an element, but the Supreme Court must decide
whether the rule is the same under the federal Constitution.
The rate is not confiscatory under the federal Constitution if it
yields a fair return on values protected by the federal Constitution. The rule of the Supreme Court, says Mr. Justice
Brandeis, is that such franchises to use highways are to be
valued as property of the recipient only to the amount that has
been paid for them. An explanation of the commission's urging
in the Supreme Court an objection not urged in the state court
is that the state court had rejected its estimate of annual depreciation and had required it to figure the annual depreciation on
present replacement value, thus causing it to add over $750,000
to the annual depreciation charge. This, says Mr. Justice Sutherland, was clearly right, since the purpose of the annual
depreciation charge is to get a sum sufficient to restore the property and not merely to, recoup its original cost. Mr. Justice
Brandeis disagrees. Justices Holmes and Stone join in his
dissent, and Mr. Justice Stone adds a brief separate dissent.
The issue as to depreciation had been raised by the commission
both on cross-appeal and on petition for certiorari. The first
was dismissed and the second denied, since Mr. Justice Sutherland held that the issile of depreciation could be considered on
the appeal of the company, as it was contested throughout the
proceedings, and is a necessary element to be determined in
fixing the rate of fare. On the issue of rate of return, Mr.
Justice Brandeis observed that 6.26 per cent on such property
as that of the particular company "would seem to be compensatory." He added that the return would be 6.70 per cent if the
$5,000,000 item for street rights had been excluded, and would
be 7.78 per cent if in addition the annual depreciation charge
had been computed according to what he deems a proper method.
The commission had allowed for annual depreciation a sum equal
to five per cent of the gross receipts, which had been the
company's annual charge for depreciation since 1912. Mr.
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Justice Brandeis points out that if the company had in the past
five years charged oif depreciation on the basis allowed it in the
Supreme Court, it would have had no book-keeping profits, and
would have paid all its dividends illegally, since the depreciation
charge would have wiped out its book surplus by 1925. The
rates to which the company objected as insufficient were a cash
fare of ten cents, with four tokens for thirty-five cents. This
was an advance allowed by the commission, which the state
court held adequate because of the 6.26 per cent return. The
Supreme Court holds that the injunction against these rates
should have been granted, and so reverses the state court. A
minor complaint of the company against abolishing a second
fare zone on a suburban line was held to raise no constitutional
objection if the commission allowed rates which yield a fair
return on the whole property, even though the particular exten21
sion may not be operated with profit.
=Various matters concerning rate regulation are discussed in notes
in 15 Nat. Mun. Rev. 554, 615, 663, 725, on "rate regulation"; in 15
Nat. Mun. Rev. 362, on "reproduction cost or actual cost"; in 15 Iowa
L. Rev. 198, on "reproduction cost and original prudent investment";
in 17 Nat. Mun. Rev. 104, 705, on the Massachusetts "prudent investment" plan of valuation; in 30 Colum. L. Rev. 548 on the Bauer-Bonbright proposal in New York; in 36 Yale L. J. 279, on property actually
in use; in 23 Mich. L. Rev. 670, on past losses as an element for consideration; in 16 Nat. Mun. Rev. 669; 17 Nat. Mun. Rev. 242; and 14
Va. T. Rev. 225, on commutation rates; in 21 Mich. L. Rev. 231 and
2 Wis. L. Rev. 168, on basing rates on cost of serving each city and
not of serving a group of cities; in 29 Colum. L. Rev. 643, on apportionment of joint costs; in 17 Nat. Mun. Rev. 51, 103, on prohibiting
gas service charge; in 5 Notre Dame Law. 99, on penalties for past
due payments; in 24 Colum. L. Rev. 528, on recent statutes relating to
carriers; in 86 Ann. Amer. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 1-248 (No. 175,
Nov., 1919) on "the railroad problem"; in 14 Cornell L. Q. 233, on
expenditures to influence public opinion; in 14 Calif. L. Rev. 340, on
failure to file rates; in 26 Mich. L. Rev. 415, on testing constitutionality
of rate statute involving heavy penalties; in 28 Mich. L. Rev. 350, on
injunction against reducing electric rates; in 5 Ind. L. J. 635, on what
must be shown to get temporary injunction; in 78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 918,
on absence of judicial power to fix rates; in 26 Mich. L. Rev. 823, on
review of contract rates by commission; in 3 U. Cin. L. Rev. 232, on
rulings of commission based on evidence not disclosed to parties; in
34 W. Va. L. Q. 183, on competition in public service; in 8 Neb. L.
Bul. 451, on forbidding discrimination; in 23 Mich. L. Rev. 69 and 3
Neb. L. Bul. 270, on constitutionality of statute allowing pass to ministers and Y. M. C. A. secretaries; and in 14 Iowa L. Rev. 494 and 13
Minn. L. Rev. 627, on power of city to fix minimum rate.
On matters relating to service, see notes in 11 Minn. L. Rev. 284,
on power of public service commission to waive compliance with regulations; in 41 Harv. L. Rev. 542 and 76 U. Pa. L. Rev. 456, on giving
preference to railroad in operating bus service; in 21 Ill. L. Rev. 502,
on discrimination between companies operating motor bus lines in
favor of company with contract; in 37 Harv. L. Rev. 395, on free bus
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That there are uncertainties incident to the enterprise of determining present fair value and of estimating the net returns
from rates not yet in force may be inferred from Brushl Electria
Co. v. Galveston22 in which the Supreme Court approved of the
action of the district court in withholding an injunction pending actual trial of rates complained of. As Mr. Justice Sutherland put it, "the evidence is so conflicting and the conclusion to
be drawn therefrom in respect of this or that item so uncertain
and speculative, that we do not feel warranted in disturbing
the findings of the court below in the absence of an actual test
under the new rates." The uncertainties here present do not seem
to differ greatly in kind or in amount from those which have
appeared in many other records on which the court has found
itself able to reach positive conclusions. Estimates of accrued
depreciation varied from 15 to 40 per cent. The master fixed
it at 28 per cent which the district court increased to 33 and onetbird per cent. By this and some other changes the $800,000
rate base found by the master was estimated provisionally by the
district judge to be $612,000. The other difference between the
master and the district judge was the reduction to four per cent
of the master's allowance of four and one-half per cent for
annual depreciation. Both agreed on a required annual return
of eight per cent. On the master's estimates, this return was
more than realized under the actual operation of the 1918
rates complained of. He found, however that the lower 1919
rateg would yield less than the required fair return by $22,000.
The district judge, by using a higher accrued depreciation and
a lower annual depreciation, estimated that the 1919 rates would
yield over $21,000 in excess of the required fair return. The
parties had agreed that the undepreciated values of the physical
property was $784,689 on the basis of January 1920 prices. Mr.
Justice Sutherland says that the master found that this amount,
"after deducting the value of the real estate, office and utility
equipment, and depreciation, represented the depreciated value
of the depreciable property for rate-making purposes."
He
service as unfair competition; and in 40 Harv. L. Rev. 882, on motor
bus regulation.
In 32 Yale L. J. 390, 507, are discussions of Galveston Electric Co.
v. Galveston, 258 U. S. 3S8, 42 Sup. Ct. 351 (1922), which is reviewed
In 21 Mich. L. Rev. 310-313. The case in the court below is considered
in 1 Tex. L. Rev. 89.
-262 U. S. 443, 43 Sup. Ct. 606 (1923).

KmiTucxy LAw JoUtiA.A
says also that the master, by deducting 28 per cent for depreciation, made "the present depreciated value of the depreciable
property $534,818."
To this the master "added the value of
various items, including intangible property, real estate, and
office and utility equipment, bringing the total up to $800,000."
All this would be more understandable if the agreed $784,689
for the undepreciated value of the physical property at 1920
prices were taken by the master as the undepreciated rather
than the depreciated value of the depreciable property. Even
if this were done, however, the 28 per cent reduction for accrued
depreciation would not give the $534,818, which the master
found as the depreciated value of the depreciable property.
Inasmuch as the parties stipulated and the master agreed "that
the cost of the physical property at average pre-war prices undepreciated, as of January 1, 1920, was $576,898," the provisional value of the lower court recognized an enhancement of
over $35,000 in an enterprise in which depreciable property was
estimated to have before it only two-thirds of its originally
allotted span of usefulness. It may well be that the court was
as much influenced by a feeling that the position of the enterprise was far from precarious as by a feeling that the contradictions in the estimates were unresolvable. While the figures
presented in the opinion do not seem to correspond with each
other, the differences in the competing guesses seem to present
no harder problems than the court has felt itself competent to
solve in many other cases. The frank recognition accorded to
the speculative character of the estimates here involved might
perhaps profitably be extended beyond the confines of the par2 3

ticular case.

OBy the so-called Recapture Provision of the Transportation Act,
the roads were restricted in their use of so-called excess earnings. The
general features of the plan were sustained in Dayton-Goose Creek
Railway Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct. 169 (1924),
reviewed in 26 Colum. L. Rev. 404-407. In determining values for the
purpose of recapturing the so-called excess ireturn, the statute directed
that the Commission "shall give due consideration to all the elements
of value recognized by the law of the land for rate-making purposes,
and shall give to the property investment account of the carriers
only that consideration which under such law it is entitled to in establishing values for rate-making purposes." A question of valuation
under this statutory requirement arose in St. Louis & O'Fallon Rail.
way Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461, 49 Sup. Ct. 384 (1929), in which
the majority found that the Commission had given no consideration to
current, or reproduction costs, and held that therefore its order should
be annulled because not reached in conformity to the statute. Mr.
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The rates involved in Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde2 4 were
ones fixed by the state superintendent of insurance under a
statutory mandate to reduce rates when upon investigation he
iinds that for the past five years the earnings of the stock fire
insurance companies within the state have yielded an aggregate
profit in excess of what is reasonable. The companies did not
contest the constitutionality of the statute but objected only to
the reduction ordered by the superintendent and approved by
the state court. The companies objected to the basis on which
Justice McReynolds said that the weight to be given to such 'cost is
not before the court, and observed in addition that "no doubt there
are some, perhaps many, railroads the ultimate value of which should
be placed far below the sum necessary for reproduction." In dissenting
opinions, Justices Brandeis and Stone insisted that the Commission
had considered reproduction costs and given to them such weight as
it found they deserved in the particular case, and that there was no
evidence in the record sufficient to justify the court in finding that the
result did not accord with the prescription of the statute. Each writer
of a dissent concurred with the other, and Mr. Justice Holmes concurred with both. Mr. Justice Brandeis outlined at length the reasons
for his judgment that "current cost of reproduction higher than the
original cost does not necessarily tend to prove a higher present
value."
For discussions of the Supreme Court decision, see John Bauer,
"The O'Fallon Case--The Decision and What it Portends," 18 Nat.
Mun. Rev. 458; Charles B. Elder, "The St. Louis and O'Fallon Decision-What Does it Mean?," 24 Il1. L. Rev. 296; Alfred Evens, "Valuation in the Supreme Court," 16 Am. B. A. J. 485; William L. Ransom,
"Undetermined Issues in Railroad Valuation under the O'Fallon Decision," 44 Pol. Sci. Q. 321; Gustavus H. Robinson, "The O'Fallon Case:
Latest Battle in the Public Utility Valuation War," 8 N. C. L. Rev. 3;
William M. Wherry, "The O'Fallon Case," 7 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 39; and
notes in 15 Cornell L. Q, 314; 5 Ind. L. J. 120; 8 Tex. a, Rev. 566;
4 Tulane L. Rev. 135; and 78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 85.
For discussions prior to the Supreme Court decision, see John
Bauer, "Interstate Commerce Commission Adopts Actual Investment
at Cost Basis," 16 Nat. Mun. Rev. 454; and notes in 7 Bost. U.fL. Rev.
319; 3 Ind. L. J. 225; 22 Il1. L. Rev. 325; 12 Minn. L. Rev. 534; 16
Nat. Mun. Rev. 340, 730; 17 Nat. Mun. Rev. 50, 102; and 36 Yale L.
J. 1151.
24275 U. S. 440, 48 Sup. Ct. 174 (1928). The case in the court below
is discussed in notes in 41 Harv. L. Rev. 532 and 15 St. Louis L. Rev.
400.
After the rates involved in the principal case had been put in
force and the superintendent had designated the classes to which they
applied, the various companies brought separate actions contesting
the validity of the rates and the constitutionality of the statute. The
federal district court denied an interlocutory injunction on the ground
that the companies had not complied with a stipulation in the prior
proceedings under which they were permitted to charge the higher
rates subject to restoring the excess to customers if the reduction
should be sustained. There was dispute as to the terms and effect of
the stipulation, but in National Fire Insurance Co. v. Thompson, 281
U. S. 331, 50 Sup. Ct. 288 (1930), Mr. Justice Butler found that it
Imposed the obligation to restore the excess and that the district court
rightly denied the Injunction until restoration was made.
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the superintendent's computations were made, but there was no
allegation by any one of them that the rates allowed to it were
unreasonable or non-compensatory. The action was a joint one
authorized by the state statute to secure a judicial review de
ovo of the superintendent's order. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari but then dismissed the writ on the ground that no
federal question was presented by a complaint based on the
inadequacy of the rates by the test of the aggregate profits of
all the companies. Mr. Justice Butler says that the Constitution
does not safeguard aggregate profits sufficient to constitute just
compensation for all. Such aggregate profits might not yield
compensatory returns for individual complaining companies.
A company receiving just compensation cannot complain because
the application of the same rates to some of its competitors may
infringe their constitutional rights. While no company would
be able in the long run to collect higher pre~miums than those
charged by its competitors, no company has a constitutional
right to prevent the enforcement against its competitors of rates
that are compensatory for them even though they are so low as
to be confiscatory for it. The conclusion from the opinion i§ of
course that the rates were fixed on a basis that affords no test of
their constitutionality. The case seems to hold that objections
confined to the methods of computation in applying an inappropriate standard are not directed to any test of the unconstitutionality of the resulting rates. Whether there might have been
relief if the complaint had been directed against the inappropriateness of the standard of aggregate profit, rather than to the
method by which aggregate profits were computed, may possibly
raise a different question from the one passed upon by the court.
Yet it is not unreasonable to infer from the opinion that the only
test of unconstitutionality is to be found in the results of applying the rate to the business of the particular complainant.
A five-cent fare on certain lines of a street railway was contested as confiscatory in Georgia Railway & Power Co. v. Decatur,25 but the court did not pass on the question of confiscation, because it found the fare validly fixed by contract over
part of the route and not justified by contract over the rest of
the route. Mr. Justice Sutherland declared that the extension
of the five-cent fare to territory to which the contract did not
262 U. S. 432, 43 Sup. Ct. 613 (1923).
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apply was an impairment of the obligation of the contract by
adding to its burdens. This strange doctrine would seem to
imply that there is no power of rate regulation outside of contract. Very likely it was tacitly assumed that the five-cent fare
was confiscatory. The opinion discloses that the commission
fixed a seven-cent fare on concededly non-contract lines, and it
appears from the brief that the company contended that the cost
of service was 9.29 cents per passenger. The opinion gives no
figures as to valuation or expenses or return.
In the companion case of Georgia Railway & Power Co. v.
College Park,26 it was also held, without discussion of confiscation, that the application of the five-cent fare to an extension
not covered by the five-cent contract was an impairment of the
obligation of that contract.
In a number of cases the chief or only effort to support the
rates objected to by the utility was founded on the contention
that it was bound by contract whether the rate was compensatory or not. Where the contract is found to be controlling,
there is no need to give details as to the effect of the rates. No
figures are given in the opinion in Southern Utilities Co. v.
Palatke2 7 in which a franchise contract for a rate of ten cents
per kilowatt was held binding. The affirmance of a contract rate
of $1.35 per thousand cubic feet for fuel gas in St. Cloud Publiv
Service Go. v. St. Cloud 28 left it unnecessary to pass upon the
company's claim that it would require an increase to $3.39 to
make the rate adequate. The binding contract for a five-cent
fare established in Georgia Power Co. v. Decatur29 made immaterial the losses attributable to the line to which it applied. Here
the cost of furnishing the transportation exceeded the revenue
and there was less than no compensation for the use of the property. On non-contract lines the commission had4 allowed a fare
of ten cents, subject to the requirement to sell four tickets for
thirty cents.
In several cases in which the claimed contracts were found
to have been abrogated or never to have been binding, the concession that the rates were confiscatory rendered it unnecessary
"a262 U. S. 441, 43 Sup. Ct. 617 (1923).
21268 U. S. 232, 45 Sup. Ct. 488 (1925).
265 U. S. 352, 44 Sup. Ct. 492 (1924).
0 281 U. S. 505, 50 Sup. Ct. 369 (1930). The contract phase of the
case is presented in 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1019-1021.
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to discuss problems of valuation and return. Valuations had
been made below in Denney v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph
Co., 30 and the master and the court had rejected those of the

commission, but Mr. Justice McReynolds says nothing about
them except that it is not contended that the rates would yield
an adequate return. So also in Railroad Commission v. Los
Angeles Bailway Corporation31 he says only that it was conceded that the finding below with respect to the inadequacy of
the five-cent fare is sustained by the evidence. Something more
by way of recital is given by Mr. Justice Butler in PaducakL V.
Paduca Railway Co.32 in which he says that the company
offered sufficient evidence to sustain its contention of confiscation
and the city offered no evidence and made no serious claim that
the rates were sufficient, if they could not-be justified by contract. The company claimed an investment of $854,303 on which
there should be an eight per cent return of $72,350.10. It
showed that its actual return under the contested rates was less
than operating expenses, including depreciation and taxes. The
franchise basic rate was six cents. The company said it would
need a basic rate of 13.5 cents to provide sufficient revenue at
existing price levels, but in the hope of declining prices it
offered a basic rate of ten cents. The six cent fare; to which it
was held was contained in a franchise of 1919 under which it
began operations.
A temporary injunction against a schedule of telephone
rates was affirmed in Prendergastv. New York Telephone Co. 83
largely on the ground that the granting of such temporary
injunctions rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and
that an order granting sucL an injunction will nol be disturbed
unless contrary to some rule of equity or the result of an improvident exercise of judicial discretion. The company had been
required to give a bond to make restitution if the rates allowed
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U. S. 97, 48 Sup. Ct. 223 (1928).
31280 U. S. 145, 50 Sup. Ct. 71 (1929). The contract phase of the
case is discussed in Richard J. Smith, "The Judicial Interpretation
of Public Utility Franchises," 39 Yale L. J. 956; and in notes in 10
Bost. U..L. Rev. 252; 18 Calif. L. Rev. 427; 30 Colum. L. Rev. 527;
28 Mich. L. Rev. 774; 19 Nat. Mun. Rev 51, 110; 7 N. Y. Univ. L. Rev.
764; and 39 Yale L. J. 956.
1261 U. S. 267, 43 Sup. Ct. 335 (1923).
3262 U. S. 43, 43 Sup. Ct. 466 (1923).
On the controversy in its
earlier phases, see Nathaniel Gold, "The New York Telephone Rate
Decision," 19 Nat. Mun. Rev. 180; and a note in 15 Nat. Mun. Rev. 419.

STATE RATE REGULATION AND THE SUPREME COUrT

217

by the temporary decree were later set aside. This protected
the consumers as the injunction protected the company, and the
decree was said by Mr. Justice Sanford to have in its favor the
fact that it preserves the ultimate rights of both parties, as the
denial of a decree would not. The company moved to dismiss
the appeal, on the ground that a subsequent grant of higher
rates by the conmission established that the former were confiscatory. Mr. Justice Sanford rejected this on the ground that
the later rates might still be questioned. He pointed out, too,
that what might be right at a later time does not establish what
was right under earlier conditions. The only reference to the
valuation issue was the report of the finding of the district
court that the fair value of the company's property could not
be reduced much below $300,000,000, and that the prescribed
rates could not possibly yield a fair return on such a valuation.3 4
Questions of valuation were also left technically undetermined in Banton v. Belt Line Railway Corporation35 by reason
of the finding that the company's share of the joint through
rate prescribed would yield less than the specific costs of carriage. A commission order of October 29, 1912, had established
the joint route, prescribed a fare of five cents per passenger, and
assigned to the complainant two cents per passenger for its share
of the joint carriage. The apportionment was not contested, and
apparently the power to establish a joint fare was not in issue,
although the company had earlier filed a petition with the commission requesting its elimination. The commission itself had
in preliminary proceedings raised the joint fare to seven cents,
but the carrier had objected to this as insufficient, and no final
determination of the matter was had, so that the effect of the
commission action was to command continued compliance with
the order of 1912. On suit to enjoin the order as confiscatory,
an injunction was granted by the district court. The company
presented figures showing that operating expenses and taxes
were more than two cents per passenger. The master found that
the transfer traffic would cost more than twice what it would
yield, and the district court found that the expense would be
slightly in excess of the yield. M'r. Justice Butler finds that
3" Report

of a local rate controversy is given in John Bauer, "Both

Sides Win-Worcester Electric Rate Case," 18 Nat. Mun. Rev. 314.

"268 U. S. 413, 45 Sup. Ct. 534 (1925), reviewed on another point

in 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1008.
K. L. J.-3
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the evidence justifies the conclusion that the returns would not
equal the expense, and the decree of the district court enjoining
enforcement of the order is confirmed.
The only question in Arkansas Railroad Commission v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.36 was whether a carrier was justified
in raising intrastate rates in order to make them correspond
with a raise in interstate rates. The former intrastate rates had
been fixed to comply with an order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission with respect to the relation between interstate and
intrastate rates. When this Commission later raised the interstate rates, the carrier professed to assume that the earlier order
required a correpsonding increase in the intrastate rates. Mr.
Justice Brandeis found that the later order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission refused to command an increase of
Arkansas local rates and that it therefore confined the earlier
order to a parity between the rates then existing and kept it
from applying to later changes. He remarked that it would be
well for a carrier, in case of doubt as to the effect of an order
of the Interstate Commerc Commission, to apply to that Commission for a ruling on the point, rather than to proceed to act
on its own interpretation. The proceeding in the principal case
started by an injunction in the federal district court against the
action of the state commission in suspending for examination a
commodity tariff fied by the carrier. The decree enjoining the
order was reversed by the Supreme Court. No questions of
valuatioA or remuneration are presented in the opinion.
No question of valuation was involved in Northern Pacifi
Railway Co. v. Department of Public Works 37 in which a carrier
complained that existing rates on intrastate transportation of
logs did not defray the operating costs of the traffic and its
share of taxes, and objected to an order of the state commission
reducing them. The carrier offered detailed testimony in support of its contention. The commission made little direct effort
to refute this, but relied on an estimate as to the cost of the
log traffic by assigning to it a share of the operating cost of all
freight traffic over the systems of the roads involved, without
taking account of specific differences in the kind of merchandise,
the length of haul, the density of traffic, or the character of the
0274 U. S. 597, 47 Sup. Ct. 724 (1927).
n268 U. S. 39, 45 Sup. Ct. 412 (1925).
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route. This, said Mr. Justice Brandeis, was a fundamental
error which vitiated the whole process by which the commission
reached its conclusion, and made the conclusion an arbitrary act
wanting in due process because of absence of evidence to support
it. The state court was reversed for denying relief in an action
by the carrier to set aside the order.
Another contest over a particular rate on intrastate carriage
of logs arose in Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission3s as a result of the decision of the state court sustaining an order of a commission to reduce existing rates by ten
per cent. The carriers had offered evidence tending to show that
operating expenses chargeable to the intrastate log traffic did
not equal the revenues therefrom. Both commission and state
court refused to consider( and give weight to that evidence, basing their refusal on the conclusion that the intrastate carriage
of logs was contributory to the subsequent long interstate haul of
lumber and that, therefore, the two operations should be considered together and the carriers were not entitled to contest the
intrastate log rates without showing the results of the whole
carriage before and after metamorphosis. This was held to be
a fundamental error. The carrier cannot justify intrinsically
excessive interstate rates on lumber because of losses on intrastate rates on logs, nor can it be required by the state to haul the
logs at inadequate compensation because of the possibility of
recoupment from the interstate rates on lumber. The methods
by which the commission reached its conclusion were declared by
Mr. Justice Butler to be arbitrary and to constitute a denial of
due process of law. The Interstate Commerce Commission had
permitted but not qommanded the reduction of the interstate
rates on logs. The state commission's command to make corresponding reduction of the intrastate rates was criticised because
of its effect in destroying the relation between intrastate and
interstate log rates in the same territory.
No decision on the merits was rendered in Pacific Telephone
& Telegraph Co. v. Kuykendall" in which the district court
was reversed for denying an injunction on the disapproved
finding that the petitioner had not exhausted its administrative
remedies, and the case was sent back for hearing on the subsl274 U. S. 344, 47 Sup. Ct. 604 (1927).
1265 U. S. 196, 44 Sup. Ct. 553 (1924).
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stantive issue. Mr. Chief Justice Taft states that the averments
of the bill show a clear case of confiscation. These include
allegations that the "fair and reasonable value" of the property was some $35,000,000, with no inclusion of anything for
franchises or for "going concern," that the company was entitled to eight per cent as a fair return on this value, and that
the highest returns under the rates complained of were 4.97
per cent on cost and 3.67 on present fair value. The opinion
includes no statements as to actual returns, or methods of computing expenses or depreciation.
In the companion case of Home Telephone & Telegraph
Co. v. Kuykendal 40 the allegations are of a cost of over $4,000,000, a present value of $5,710,684, a necessary return of 8 per
cent, and an actual return in the best year of 3.07 per cent on
cost and of 2.28 per cent on "fair value." In this case, too, the
decree denying an injunction was reversed and the cause remanded for hearing on the merits.
The facts in Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,41 as conceded by motion to dismiss, showed deficits of $48,000 and of
$65,000 for the past two years, after paying operating expenses
and taxes and with no deduction for depreciation. The alleged
fair value of the property, including working capital and going
value, was $3,800,000. The district court had enjoined the commission from the further enforcement of the existing approved
schedule of rates and from taking any steps against the company by reason of the collection by it of rates under a higher
proposed schedule. This was affirmed by a unanimous court,
Mr. Justice Stone not sitting. The opinion of Mr. Justice
Sutherland is concerned with the question whether the complainant had exhausted its legislative remedies before appealing to the court. Long delay by the commission in passing upon
the proposed new schedule was held to be a sufficient reason for
seeking judicial relief without further poking at administrative
42
procrastination.
0265 U. S. 206, 44 Sup. Ct. 557 (1924).
11270 U. S. 587, 46 Sup. Ct. 408 (1926).
2At the succeeding term of court another controversy between the
same parties with respect to rates in the Chicago district was reviewed
by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in Smith v. Illinois BeN Telephone Co.,
282 U. S. 133, 51 Sup. Ct. 65 (1930), and the injunction granted by the
court below was set aside and the cage remanded with direction to
make more specific findings as to annual depreciation, apportionment
of interstate and intrastate operations, and the fairness of contracts
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No details of valuation are given in the opinion of Mr.
Justice MNcReynolds in Ottinger v. Consolidated Gas Co., 43
which affirmed the district court in enjoining as confiscatory
a rate of $1 per thousand feet for gas of 650 British thermal
units. This rate had been fixed by statute after the commission
had fixed a rate of $1.15 per thousand for gas of 537 thermal
units, following a Supreme Court decision declaring confiscatory the further application of an old statute prescribing an
eighty-cent rate. The commission accepted the district court's
decision denouncing the new legislative dollar rate, and did
not appeal. The state attorney general took an appeal, apparently contesting the judgment that the rate was confiscatory.
Air. Justice McReynolds says that the master took evidence
and reported on valuation and expenses and concluded that
the new rate would yield less than six per cent on the value,
and was therefore confiscatory. To this he adds that the district court agreed with the master and that the attorney general
offers nothing in argument to justify the reversal of the decree

so far as it directs appropriate injunctions. Since, however,
the finding of confiscation was sufficient to dispose of the quarrel,
the decree of the district court is modified to confine it to the
enforcement of the rate against the complainant without enjoining enforcement generally or without decreeing that the accept-

ance by the company of an earlier rate constituted a binding
agreement between it and the state. Mr. Justice Brandeis confines his concurrence to the result.
This decision was followed in Ottinger v. Brooklyn Union
for supplies and service between the company and its affiliates in the
American Bell system. While the Chief Justice says nothing which
explicitly indicates disapproval of criteria laid down in previous decisions, the general tenor of his opinion seems less lenient toward company claims than were the opinions and the decisions of the majority
of the court during the eight years prior to his return to the bench.
Thus, though he recites the previous ruling that property acquired
by use of reserves for depreciation is to be included in the rate base,
he adds that "the recognition of the ownership of the property represented by the reserve does not make it necessary to allow similar
accumulations to go on if experience shows that those are excessive."
Quite immaterial from the standpoint of the reproduction cost of the
property at present prices Is the further statement that "the record
of the Illinois Company shows that for many years it has been able
to expand its business so as to meet increasing demands, to pay its
operating expenses including interest on money borrowed, to pay dividends of eight per cent upon its capital stock, and to accumulate a,
surplus."
4272 U. S. 576, 47 Sup. Ct. 198 (1926).
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in which the only difference was that in the case of
the companies here involved the master found that the dollar
rate would yield a return of less than five per cent on the value.
According to Mr. Justice McReynolds the records in these cases
were voluminous, but we are left without recital of anything
but the master's conclusions. Evidently the master irked him
a little, for he calls his report "too much burdened with unimportant dissertations" and "somewhat oracular-as in the lines
which make solemn declaration concerning the position
which this court must ultimately take regarding valuations in
rate cases."
A decree of the district court, which enjoined the further
enforcement of a five-cent fare on the New York subways and
affiliated elevated lines, was reversed in Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co.4 5 on the ground that the complainant had not exhausted its administrative remedies and for the
further reason that the issue whether the company was restricted by contract to a five-cent fare depended upon intricate
questions of state law which the federal courts should not attempt to pass upon in advance of a determination by the state
court. The claim that the five-cent rate is confiscatory depended
upon the assumption that the subways and the elevated lines
are to be treated as a unit. The subways were owned by the
city. The elevated lines were privately owned and were leased
to the company operating the subway. Mr. Justice IcReynolds
says that on the record before the court it cannot be assumed
that subway and elevated operations must be regarded as a
unit. The income of the elevated above operating expenses and
taxes was about $4,000,000, and the payment due from the
lessee to the lessor under the lease was about $8,000,000, so that
the five-cent fare on the elevated was clearly confiscatory so
far as the lessee was concerned. The opinion does not disclose
whether the court thinks that the issue of confiscation should
be determined upon the basis of the contract situation of the
operating company or upon the valuation of the leased lines.
Gas

" 272 U. S. 579, 47 Sup. Ct. 199 (1926).
45279 U. S. 159, 49 Sup. Ct. 282 (1929), considered in 30 Colum.
L. Rev. 527; 4 Notre Dame Law 564; and 4 St. Johns L. Rev. 76. For
discussions prior to the Supreme Court decision, see John Bauer, "The
New York Rapid Transit Contracts Before the Supreme Court," 7
N. Y. Univ. L. Rev. 120; and notes in 28 Colum. L. Rev. 812; 17 Nat.
Mun. Rev. 348, 703; and 18 Nat. Mun. Rev. 47.
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It observed that the present value of the elevated lines "is
very large, but to determine this with fair accuracy would be
exceedingly difficult." From the operation of the subways the
company was realizing some $17,000,000 annually. It claimed
that it was entitled to an eight per cent return on their value
estimated at $600,000,000, or $240,000,000 over their cost. These
subways are the property of the city and are declared by statute
to be public streets. The claim that their value should be taken
as the basis for estimating the return, said Mr. Justice MeReynolds, "is unprecedented and ought not to be accepted without
more cogent support than the present record discloses." The
only property connected with the subways to which the lessee
had title was operating equipment costing some $60,000,000,
real estate valued at $300,000, and some office equipment of
small value. In addition it had advanced under the contract
$58,000,000 toward the construction. So far as appears, it
could claim no return on this except under the contract. These
comments of Mr. Justice McReynolds on the separate identity
of elevated line and subways and on the property of the company in the subways on which it is entitled to a fair return do
not constitute adjudications, but they suggest the interesting
predicament in which the company might find itself if it should
ever be held that the fare contract had been-abrogated, that the
elevated was an enterprise distinct from the subway, and that
the fair return on the subway was to be based on the property
owned by the company. No increase in rates would be likely
to make the elevated remunerative to the lessee, and the loss of
the high profits on subway operations by reduction of the subway rates would end the surplus that may now compensate for
the elevated deficit. It may well be that the contract that
fixes a five-cent fare is one that the company has reason to be
grateful for. The injunction against the five-cent fare, which
the district court had granted, was an interlocutory one. The
Supreme Court granted a stay which kept the five-cent fare in
operation. After a re-argument, the decree of the district court
-was reversed. Without revealing their reasons, Justices Van
Devanter, Sutherland and Butler dissented.
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